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619 
HATE SPEECH—DEFINITIONS & 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
Katharine Gelber* 
James Weinstein’s paper is a thoughtful, refreshing and 
considered contribution to the ongoing debate over whether or 
not hate speech laws can be justified in liberal democratic orders. 
As a political scientist who has spent 20 years investigating, 
analyzing, and reporting on the introduction, implementation, 
and effects of hate speech laws, I wish to focus in my commentary 
on the empirical assumptions and claims that inform Weinstein’s 
argument. I will focus on three. The first is his failure to 
conceptualize hate speech in a way that is commensurate with 
much of the philosophical literature focussing on definitions of 
hate speech. The second is his apparent reluctance to concede that 
hate speech (in both vituperative and more modest forms) is 
capable of harming political participation to the degree he would 
require, or in the ways he would require, in order for hate speech 
laws to be justifiable in political legitimacy terms. The third are 
his empirical claims about the operation of hate speech laws in 
practice. 
WHAT IS HATE SPEECH? 
On the first point, Weinstein’s article lacks a clear conception 
of hate speech. To be fair, it is part of Weinstein’s argument that 
the lack of a clear definition of hate speech is in fact part of the 
problem. In part, I agree with him. In particular, I find the use of 
the term ‘hate’ to be misleading in this context, since it implies 
that the defining feature of hate speech is virulent dislike of a 
person for any reason. As I will explain below, this is not my, or 
 
 * Professor of Politics and Public Policy, University of Queensland. I am grateful 
to the Australian Research Council for financial support (FT110100114, DP1096721), and 
to Adrienne Stone, Susan Brison, Alex Brown, and Jim Weinstein for helpful discussions 
on the thoughts in this article. 
4 - GELBER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/1/17  9:54 AM 
620 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 32:619 
 
others’, view of the defining feature of hate speech. Nevertheless, 
it is a term that is widely used in the literature. 
Weinstein’s complaint about the lack of definition of hate 
speech, however, is different from mine. He claims that, in spite 
of Waldron’s claim that hate speech laws only restrict people from 
expressing their views in particularly vituperative ways, and not 
from expressing their points of view on any topic, hate speech laws 
do in fact result in poor applications in practice. He argues further 
that these applications put people through difficult and time 
consuming legal processes without good reason. I will deal 
separately with this latter claim below. 
Weinstein navigates through this component of his argument 
by describing hate speech in his introduction as expression that 
“demeans.”1 Later, when discussing a case adjudicated in the 
European Court of Human Rights, he suggests that because 
Gillmerveen’s discourse was “odious” but had “little vituperation 
and no use of epithets,” it was a case of the misapplication of hate 
speech laws.2 He similarly laments the lack of vituperation and/or 
epithets in some of his other examples of the misapplication of 
hate speech laws. He implies quite strongly, therefore, that (at 
least) two of the defining features of hate speech, properly 
understood, are vituperation and the use of epithets. 
With respect, this pays no attention to the considerable body 
of literature that has developed over the last few decades, which 
discusses how hate speech is expression that materially and 
substantively harms its targets in the saying of that speech (and 
not only in terms of a discreet, consequential harm arising from 
it). These speech-act theory informed perspectives both on racist 
hate speech3 and on pornography4 argue that harm can occur 
whether the hate speech is expressed in vituperative terms or not, 
and whether epithets are used or not. According to this literature, 
the defining features of hate speech are not whether it is 
 
 1. James Weinstein, Hate Speech Bans, Democracy and Political Legitimacy, 32 
CONST. COMMENT. 527, 527 (2017). 
 2. Id. at 554. 
 3. See, e.g., SPEECH AND HARM: CONTROVERSIES OVER FREE SPEECH (Ishani 
Maitra & Mary Kate McGowan eds., 2012); WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE 
THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (Mari J. Matsuda et al. 
eds., 1993). 
 4. See, e.g., Rae Langton, Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
293, 297 (1993). See also Rae Langton, Whose Right? Ronald Dworkin, Women, and 
Pornographers, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 311, 311–59 (1990). 
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vituperative and whether or not it contains epithets, but that it 
incurs harms discursively when the hate speech is uttered, and 
that these harms are analogous to other discriminatory harms, 
such as denying someone a service or denying them a job on the 
ground of their race or other relevant attribute. 
Indeed, in this context Waldron acknowledges that he is not 
the first theorist to have developed a liberal argument as to the 
viability of regulating hate speech. In the late 1980s and early 
1990s, Ronald Dworkin engaged in a fierce debate with other 
philosophers on the question of the regulation of pornography. In 
that debate, Dworkin argued that the regulation of pornography 
was not justifiable on democratic grounds. He viewed the case for 
the harm of pornography as inconclusive, and the silencing 
argument5 (the argument that pornography as a type of hate 
speech operates to “silence” women by rendering their 
protestations against sexual mistreatment unable to achieve their 
intended outcome of stopping that mistreatment, and by 
rendering them unable to be heard as authentic and dignified 
speakers) as unconvincing.6 In response, Jennifer Hornsby argued 
that he misunderstood the claim that pornography silences 
women.7 Rae Langton argued, using a Dworkinian version of 
liberalism, that it was possible to make out a consistent case that 
pornography ought to be regulable as a violation of women’s civil 
rights.8 Jeremy Waldron also acknowledges, in his response to 
Weinstein in this volume, that Dworkin’s view of political 
legitimacy can sustain an argument that hate speech laws 
themselves can contribute to democratic legitimacy. 
The debate between Weinstein’s response in this volume and 
Waldron’s original piece echoes that earlier one, in the sense that 
 
 5. For the most influential arguments on the silencing effects of pornography, see 
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993); Rae Langton, Beyond Belief: 
Pragmatics in Hate Speech and Pornography, in SPEECH AND HARM: CONTROVERSIES 
OVER FREE SPEECH 72–93 (Ishani Maitra & Mary Kate McGowan eds., 2012); Rae 
Langton, Subordination, Silence, and Pornography’s Authority, in CENSORSHIP AND 
SILENCING: PRACTICES OF CULTURAL REGULATION 261–84 (Robert C. Post ed., 1998); 
Rae Langton, Speech Acts, supra note 4. 
 6. Ronald Dworkin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in ISAIAH BERLIN: A CELEBRATION 
100–09 (Edna Ullmann-Margalit & Avishai Margalit eds., 1991); Ronald Dworkin, Women 
and Pornography, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Oct. 21, 1993, at 36, 37, 40–42. 
 7. Jennifer Hornsby, Speech Acts and Pornography, in THE PROBLEM OF 
PORNOGRAPHY 220–32 (Susan Dwyer ed., 1995) 
 8. Rae Langton, Whose Right? Ronald Dworkin, Women, and Pornographers, 19 
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 311, 311–59 (1990). 
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Weinstein speaks past, and appears not to hear or recognize, the 
claims that hate speech acts harm in the saying of them, and that 
they harm in important ways that silence their targets. This is not 
to say that every instance of hate speech must silence its target, as 
clearly some instances of hate speech result in wide public 
disapprobation, or mobilise counter claims by targets and their 
allies. But it is to say that hate speech properly understood is 
capable of harming in these ways, and that these harms ought to 
be recognized and interpolated into their arguments in ways that 
Weinstein has not done. 
Understanding speech-act informed claims about how hate 
speech harms is important, because if Weinstein had conceived of 
hate speech in these terms, it would have had significant 
implications for his argument. It would among other things have 
undermined his implication that it is only by not regulating hate 
speech that we ensure all individuals are able to put forward their 
point of view about laws that they may be legitimately coerced 
into obeying. He is very concerned with the evangelist 
photographer’s right to say that she does not want to take 
photographs at a same sex wedding. Yet he simultaneously treats 
differently the concerns of a same sex couple who, when faced 
with genuine hate speech, come to know through that hate speech 
that some people in society deem they are not worthy of equal 
treatment, and that their relationship is wrong, and who thereby 
become fearful of walking down the street holding hands, and 
fearful of violent attacks against them and their property on the 
basis of their sexuality. Could not such experiences, and the wider 
knowledge of those experiences among all same-sex attracted 
people, mean that the same sex couple could be silenced in much 
the same way Weinstein’s evangelical photographer felt unable to 
express her views before a law on same sex marriage was passed? 
Don’t communities who know their members regularly 
experience hate speech often feel unable to express their views on 
proposed upstream laws for fear they, too, will become targets of 
hate speech? I believe that they do, and have undertaken research 
showing that hate speech properly understood is one of the 
mechanisms by which this inability to express their views comes 
about.9 
 
 9. Katharine Gelber & Luke McNamara, Evidencing the Harms of Hate Speech, 22 
SOC. IDENTITIES 324 (2016). 
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Both Weinstein and Alex Brown10 bemoan the paucity of 
evidence on this point, the silencing effect of hate speech (as 
opposed to Weinstein’s concern with the silencing effect of hate 
speech laws). While there is not a great deal of such evidence, 
there are findings from psychology that show that individuals 
subjected to non-physical discrimination suffer significant harms 
to their physical and mental health.11 These findings bolster and 
support the silencing claim, as do arguments in the literature 
about the indirect effects of hate speech, including the 
maintenance of power imbalances within social hierarchies of 
race.12 My own, and my co-author’s, empirical research 
interviewing members of communities targeted by hate speech 
shows that targets say they experience the harms of hate speech 
that are alleged in the literature.13 They testified to effects 
including that others were persuaded of negative stereotypes, a 
conditioning of the environment such that racism was normalized, 
subordination, silencing, fear, victimization, emotional symptoms, 
restrictions on freedom, lowering of self-esteem, maintenance of 
social imbalances of power, and undermining of their dignity. 
They testified that these harms were enduring. It is therefore not 
true that there is no evidence that silencing operates in the ways 
that defenders of hate speech laws allege. 
 
 10. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 575 (citing ALEXANDER BROWN, HATE SPEECH 
LAW: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION (2015)) 
 11. I focus here on the sources that pay particular attention to hate speech as a form 
of non-physical discrimination: Ilan H. Meyer, Prejudice, Social Stress and Mental Health 
in Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual Populations: Conceptual Issues and Research Evidence, 129 
PSYCHOL. BULL., 674 (2003); Erik Vijleveld et al., The Cortisol Response to Anticipated 
Intergroup Interactions Predicts Self-Reported Prejudice, 7 PLOS ONE, no. 3, Mar. 2012, 
at 1; Kathryn Freeman Anderson, Diagnosing Discrimination: Stress from Perceived 
Racism and the Mental and Physical Health Effects, 83 SOC. INQUIRY 55 (2013); Yin 
Paradies et al., Racism as a Determinant of Health: A Protocol for Conducting a Systematic 
Review and Meta-Analysis, 2 SYS. REVS. 85 (2013); Gilbert C. Gee, A Multilevel Analysis 
of the Relationship Between Institutional and Individual Racial Discrimination and Health 
Status, 92 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 615 (2002); Ricci Harris et al., Racism and Health: The 
Relationship Between Experience of Racial Discrimination and Health in New Zealand, 63 
SOC. SCI. & MED. 1428 (2006); VICTORIAN HEALTH PROMOTION FOUND., MENTAL 
HEALTH IMPACTS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN VICTORIAN ABORIGINAL 
COMMUNITIES (2012). 
 12. M. R. ALLBROOK, STRATEGIES FOR CHANGE: ANTI-RACISM INITIATIVES FROM 
AUSTRALIA, CANADA, THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, AND THE UNITED KINGDOM 
(2001); Barbara Bloch & Tanja Dreher, Resentment and Reluctance: Working With 
Everyday Diversity and Everyday Racism in Southern Sydney, 30 J. INTERCULTURAL 
STUD. 193 (2009); Kevin M. Dunn & Jacqueline Nelson, Challenging the Public Denial of 
Racism for a Deeper Multiculturalism, 32 J. INTERCULTURAL STUD. 587 (2011). 
 13. Gelber & McNamara, supra note 9. 
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THE NEED TO ENSURE MAXIMUM POLITICAL 
PARTICIPATION 
This brings me to my second point, which is Weinstein’s 
emphasis on political participation. He emphasises how important 
it is to ensure that opportunities exist “for each individual to 
participate as an equal in the public conversation about society’s 
collective decisions.”14 He reiterates that “equal opportunity to 
participate in the political process, including in the public 
discussion of collective decisions, is essential to political 
legitimacy,”15 and that “laws about which there can be reasonable 
disagreement are subject to being rendered illegitimate if people 
capable of self-government are denied the equal opportunity to 
participate in the process by which they are enacted.”16 I could not 
agree more. The requirement of equal opportunity to participate 
in the decision making that affects one’s life is central to 
democratic legitimacy. 
The quarrel I have is with how Weinstein has applied this 
precept; specifically in his failure to acknowledge what would 
happen to his argument if he were to concede that hate speech 
itself is capable of undermining the equal opportunity in 
decisionmaking that he and I agree is fundamental to political 
legitimacy. 
Where hate speech itself is capable of undermining those 
opportunities, and where it can be identified as doing so, it would 
be a blinkered view of democratic legitimacy that would 
consciously ignore this problem. I have argued this point 
previously,17 integrating a Nussbaumian capabilities-approach to 
support a strong protection for a broad range of speech with a 
Habermasian construction of public discourse, the discourse that 
Weinstein18 and Robert Post19 place at the centre of free speech 
protection. This produces a robust argument for the protection of 
speech on public discourse grounds, based on a recognition that 
 
 14. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 528. 
 15. Id. at 536. 
 16. Id. at 539. 
 17. Katharine Gelber, Freedom of Political Speech, Hate Speech and the Argument 
from Democracy: the Transformative Contribution of Capabilities Theory, 9 CONTEMP. 
POL. THEORY 304 (2010). 
 18. James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Central Value of American Free 
Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491 (2011). 
 19. Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 483 
(2011). 
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the individuals who take part in processes of legitimation become 
capable of doing so through their individual participation in 
speech-based activities. This view integrates an understanding of 
the role of speech in individual agency, with the role of speech in 
facilitating the social organisation that underpins democratic 
processes of legitimation. 
At the same time, this view acknowledges that if the 
formation of individuals’ capacities to become capable of 
constructing and implementing their own conception of the good 
life, and their ability to instantiate that by engaging in processes 
of democratic legitimation, were imperilled by some speech, there 
is an argument for the regulation (although certainly not an 
automatic presumption of the form that regulation should take)20 
of that harmful speech. This argument requires us to take 
seriously the risks to social justice of some speech. Importantly, it 
pertains only to that speech which is capable of imperilling 
democratic processes of legitimation in this way. Thus, an 
argument for the regulation of hate speech—defined carefully and 
in a confined way as speech capable of imperilling the very 
processes of democratic legitimation with which Weinstein, Post, 
I, and others are concerned—is rendered possible. 
My argument rests on a conception of hate speech as speech 
that is directed at historically identifiable minorities;21 that targets 
them with speech that is harmful to their involvement in processes 
of democratic legitimation. This is because, in my view, the 
connection of hate speech with historically identifiable and 
systemic discrimination is key to its success in discursively 
enacting harm to a sufficient degree that it would imperil a target’s 
ability to participate in the political decision making that affects 
them. This differentiates discursively discriminatory hate speech 
from speech that may offend someone, hurt their feelings, be 
vituperative, or contain epithets, some of which may be capable 
of the discriminatory harms of hate speech, but none of which is 
definitively capable of doing so unless other factors are in place. 
 
 20. Criminal prohibition is only one (and not my favoured) policy approach to the 
problem of hate speech. Other approaches include the civil regulation of hate speech as an 
act of discrimination, or providing mechanisms and resources to enable communities to 
challenge the messages of hate speech and facilitate their speech-based response, thereby 
overcoming the silencing effect. 
 21. The direction of such speech at historically identifiable minorities is key to its 
ability to harm, and not merely to offend, because such speech discursively enacts 
discrimination that is analogous to other forms of systemic discrimination. 
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This principle overcomes the problems of relying on vituperative 
speech, or on the use of epithets, as the defining feature of hate 
speech. 
It also assists in understanding the problem Weinstein raises 
about having a law that prevents a racist landlord from calling 
would-be Pakistani tenants “cockroaches,” but does not prevent 
those would-be tenants from calling the (presumably Caucasian) 
landlord a “cockroach.”22 Weinstein’s steeping in the requirement 
under First Amendment jurisprudence to avoid viewpoint 
discrimination at all costs blinds him to the differential harms of 
these two events. Calling Pakistanis “cockroaches” is a racist term 
of abuse that likens a racial minority in a Western society to an 
animal that requires extermination. It therefore has a meaning 
and force that simply do not apply were the would-be tenants to 
call the landlord by the same epithet. Context, social power, and 
history matter in determining the harm that is occasioned in hate 
speech. 
To be sure, the argument I make here introduces a different 
challenge in identifying the kinds of hate speech that are capable 
of harming in the ways that I have outlined. However, this is not 
in principle an insurmountable problem, as the type of hate 
speech able to be regulated would need to be sufficiently harmful 
to be capable of preventing its targets from participating in 
decisions about laws that affect them, to be targeted at historically 
identifiable minorities, and to occur within a social context within 
which systemic discrimination against that minority persists.23 
Even should Weinstein not agree with the argument I have 
just outlined, he may admit that it ought to be conceivable in 
principle that some hate speech ought to be considered capable of 
undermining individuals’ ability to express their own views in 
relation to upstream laws that the state will have the right to 
coerce them into obeying. If that is the case, then hate speech 
itself is capable of undermining the democratic legitimacy that 
Weinstein and I are both concerned with protecting. 
 
 22. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 542. 
 23. This is an issue on which Weinstein and I have conversed often, and it is an issue 
I am developing further in work-in-progress. 
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HOW HATE SPEECH LAWS WORK IN PRACTICE 
The third point I wish to raise is Weinstein’s use of anecdotal 
claims about the application of hate speech laws in countries 
around the world, and his claim that his evidence shows a 
“sufficiently large number of cases to show that most hate speech 
laws, whatever their intent,”24 do not protect moderate forms of 
expressing one’s opinion that are not designed to be captured by 
hate speech laws. My quarrel here is that Weinstein has not 
substantiated his case. 
First, the total number of cases that Weinstein cites in the 
main text in which a claim of racial hatred (in some form) was 
substantiated is one in Holland, three in England, one in Scotland, 
two in Austria, one in Finland, one in France, one in Spain and 
one in Canada. This is a total of 11 cases, some of which by 
Weinstein’s own admission did not involve “hate speech” 
legislation, but rather other public order types of provisions that 
were used to shut down what was perceived to be hate speech. He 
adds to his list four complaints in which a claim of racial hatred 
was not substantiated, including (in the main text),25 two in 
France, one in Belgium and one in England. The total of cases to 
which he refers is therefore 15.26 A “sufficiently large number of 
cases” to evidence widespread misapplication of hate speech laws 
this most certainly is not. 
The first point is that, if Weinstein wishes to show the 
misapplication of hate speech laws, it would be helpful if he would 
limit his enquiry to hate speech laws, and not the misapplication 
of any other law. Jeremy Waldron also makes this point in his 
reply to Weinstein in this volume. 
The second point to make here is that this total of 15 cases in 
the main text (30 with additional cases in footnotes) is a miniscule 
proportion of the entirety of hate speech complaints that are 
made across the globe every year. I do not believe anyone has 
calculated the global number of complaints, but just to give a 
small indication of how unrepresentative Weinstein’s sample is, 
my and my co-author’s recent study into the operation of hate 
 
 24. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 561. 
 25. Weinstein includes some additional cases in his lengthy footnotes. I have only 
counted here the ones that appear in the text of the article. 
 26. In the footnotes 124, 131, and 132, Weinstein also cites and discusses 15 further 
cases, making a total of 30 cases. See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 558 n. 124, 560-61 nn. 131–
32. 
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speech laws in Australia over 25 years showed that the total 
number of complaints lodged in any given year in Australia was 
approximately 200-350.27 Weinstein’s examples (leaving aside the 
Dutch case which occurred in 1979), occurred between 2001 and 
2015, with 10 of them occurring between 2001 and 2010. During 
the same period of 2001-2010 there were 2128 complaints lodged 
in Australia. 
In 2010 alone, there were 3770 hate crimes reported in 
Germany, which included hate crimes, incitement to hatred, and 
propaganda offenses.28 In 2014-2015, there were 30,991 racially 
motivated public order offences in England and Wales.29 
These figures render Weinstein’s claim that a “sufficiently 
large” number of misapplications is occurring unsustainable in 
empirical terms. A far more in-depth and systemic study would be 
needed regarding the operation of hate speech laws in practice to 
sustain this point. 
Weinstein does not only claim that the number of such 
misapplications is large enough to be worrying. He argues further 
that cases that are unsubstantiated are “undoubtedly” causing a 
chilling effect on free speech.30 Again, there is insufficient 
evidence provided to make such a claim. The Australian study to 
which I have already referred has shown that, in spite of claims to 
the contrary, no evidence of a chilling effect was found in the 
context of 25 years of the operation of hate speech laws in 
Australia.31 Instead, Waldron’s empirical intuition—that hate 
speech laws by and large operate to prevent harmful hate speech, 
but not to stop people debating in non-vilifying ways on matters 
of public policy—was strongly upheld by the evidence obtained in 
that study.32 
Any law will have some misapplications, this is a regular 
feature of a range of laws including defamation laws, and the law 
 
 27. Katharine Gelber & Luke McNamara, The Effects of Civil Hate Speech Laws: 
Lessons from Australia, 49 L. & SOC. REV. 631, 641–42 (2015). 
 28. See OSCE Office for Democratic Inst. and Human Rights, Germany, HATE 
CRIME REPORTING (Apr. 4, 2017, 10:36 AM), http://hatecrime.osce.org/germany. 
 29. HANNAH CORCORAN ET AL., HATE CRIME, ENGLAND AND WALES, 2014/15, at 
1, 8 (2015). 
 30. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 559. 
 31. Gelber & McNamara, supra note 27, at 656–57. 
 32. Id.; Katharine Gelber & Luke McNamara, Changes in the Expression of Prejudice 
in Public Discourse in Australia: Assessing the Impact of Hate Speech Laws on Letters to 
the Editor 1992-2010, 20 AUSTL. J. HUM. RTS. 99 (2014). 
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of torts. No-one suggests that the existence and occasional 
misapplication of defamation laws or of the law of torts means 
that the laws themselves are fundamentally flawed in the sense 
that they undermine the democratic legitimacy of other, 
especially anti-discrimination, laws. 
In fact, I agree with Weinstein that some of the cases he 
mentions, in particular the cases in which Christians put forward 
their views about homosexuality, ought not to have been 
considered hate speech and ought not to have been prosecuted. 
However, I do not agree that this very small number of cases 
substantiates an argument that hate speech laws are misapplied 
with sufficient frequency to undermine Waldron’s point that they 
are intended only to be applied to genuinely harmful hate speech. 
